NATO and Russia in the 21st Century
During the first decade of the 21st century, NATO and Russia entered into several agreements on cooperation. These included the Partnership for Peace program, which Russia joined in 1994. The two nations are also co-operating on peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ukraine's demand for membership
During President Vladimir Putin's recent attack on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine's demand for membership in Russia's Nato alliance gained momentum. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the country's application for fast-track NATO membership. The Ukrainian president also signed a document with the prime minister that outlines his country's intentions to join.
But, the question still remains: is Ukraine ready to join NATO? Currently, the country does not have the votes it needs to take its membership track forward.
According to President Vladimir Putin, Ukraine has military units in the country under the de facto influence of Western advisers. Russia believes that NATO is encroaching on its sphere of influence.
The Russian government has demanded that Nato rules out any further expansion into Ukraine. It also wants Nato to suspend any drills without Russia's consent. It has also demanded that the alliance provide legal guarantees of security in occupied territories.
The Kremlin's aggressive proposals are not likely to be accepted by western capitals. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and the spheres of influence in Europe have changed dramatically.
The Kremlin is attempting to re-establish a sphere of influence over eastern Europe. Ukraine's request to join Nato is a move to protect its citizens from the revanchist Kremlin.
But, if Ukraine were to join NATO, it would be doing so under the pretense of the MAP (membership action plan). It's not clear if the MAP will actually be implemented.
The best way to get into NATO is to convince other countries to do it for you. That's what the MAP is for. The Ukraine government should focus on what it can get now, and press for more military help to deal with the invasion.
NATO's nuclear arrangements are consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Throughout the 1990's, NATO countries worked hard to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, with the US leadership, the Alliance appears to be slipping backwards.
The NPT is a legally binding treaty which prohibits nuclear weapons from being transferred to non-nuclear weapon states. However, some non-nuclear weapon states question whether NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are in line with NPT Articles I and II. Moreover, nuclear sharing is not an effective means of easing concerns about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
The US has a policy of retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first. This policy creates a loophole that allows the US to unilaterally withdraw from its NPT obligations.
Despite the US's approach, nuclear sharing arrangements continue to exist. However, they are anachronistic and no longer serve a useful purpose. The US's nuclear arsenal in Europe remains unchanged from the 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review.
A number of states have questioned whether the US's interpretation of the NPT is correct. These states believe the US's interpretation of the NPT makes it possible to withdraw from its NPT commitments without any penalty. They also question whether it would be desirable for the NPT to be interpreted as no longer controlling during a time of war. This would make the NPT inapplicable during a time of war.
The US has also argued that its nuclear sharing arrangement is in line with the NPT. The US states that the NPT does not prohibit four areas. These areas are non-proliferation, disarmament, the prevention of proliferation and nuclear sharing.
Despite the US's claims that its interpretation of the NPT is correct, it has not deposited its interpretation with other states. This has led some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to question the validity of the US interpretation.
Co-operation in peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
During the Bosnian war of 1992-1995, the United Nations authorised a no-fly zone over the country. The United Nations Security Council also established the United Nations International Police Task Force. This force assisted in securing the country. In December 1995, the NATO-led Implementation Force deployed to the country. It was responsible for implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
In December 2004 a NATO-led Stabilisation Force was deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mission was aimed at assisting the country's reconstruction after the 1992-1995 war. Its goal was to maintain the security environment and facilitate the country's reconstruction. The force remains deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.
The UN Security Council restructured the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) into three coordinated peace operations. One force remained in Bosnia, while two forces were in Croatia. The UN Protection Force was renamed the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO).
The UN Security Council also endorsed the establishment of a High Representative for the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The High Representative would help coordinate the activities of civilian organizations involved in the Peace Agreement.
The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia faced a fateful dilemma. It could either side with the Muslim victims of the war, or it could actively oppose the Bosnian Serb effort. It could also limit its role to humanitarian relief supplies.
As part of the United Nations Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), NATO participated in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1996. In addition, several non-NATO countries contributed, including Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.
The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was the first United Nations peacekeeping force to operate in Bosnia. It operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
NATO's enhanced forward presence violates the NATO-Russia Founding Act
Several years ago, NATO bolstered its military presence on the Eastern flank. However, these efforts violated a key NATO-Russia Founding Act. The act committed NATO to a number of collective defense missions, but did not commit to permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. The act also did not specify how much military force could be permanently stationed in a frontline state.
The act's main purpose was to build a sense of unity of purpose and trust. The goal was to help establish better military-to-military contacts. However, the act was not legally binding.
Russia's aggressive actions have fundamentally challenged the Alliance. The Kremlin has shown the capability to mass a military force on its periphery, a capability that the Alliance must be aware of. It has also demonstrated a willingness to pursue political goals by force. This is a threat to the long-term goal of a free and peaceful Europe.
NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) is a key component of the Alliance's new deterrent strategy. This plan aims to improve the ISR capabilities of the Baltic states and strengthen the overall defense posture of the Alliance. The EFP includes two mechanized infantry MNBGs, one led by the United Kingdom and the other by Germany, as well as two armored MNBGs, led by the US and
